Tunnel Vision or Kaleidoscope: Competing Concepts on Sudan Identity and National Integration by El-Battahani, A
37
Tunnel Vision or Kaleidoscope
Competing Concepts on Sudan 
Identity and National Integration
Atta El-Battahani
Abstract
Characterised as a bridge between the Arab-Muslim world and Black 
Africa; and as a melting pot where diverse ethnic, religious and lan-
guage groups were related together, Sudan continues to baffle observers 
and analysts by protracted conflicts and crises inflicted on its popula-
tion. Amid all these, major parties to the conflict accuse each other of 
sowing the seeds of disintegration and disunity, and on the other hand 
each claims to be the only one genuinely working for unity. This article 
discusses conceptual foundations behind these claims and positions of 
major parties to conflict. Taking the ethnic-cultural make-up of Sudan, 
the article compares and contrasts a dominant concept of ‘unity in con-
formity’, endorsed since independence by Northern ruling groups, to 
‘unity in diversity’, propagated by marginalised ethnic nationalities and 
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underprivileged classes. After setting the context of the debate between 
the two different concepts, and delineating traits of both, the article 
argues that in view of the diversity and complexity of the social forma-
tion of Sudan, and more important, the failure of ‘unity in conformity’ 
to deliver on its promises, the alternative concept of ‘unity in diversity’ is 
more adequate in laying down foundations for credible unity and viable 
identity.
Introduction
Recently the call for maintaining and promoting conflict-ridden Sudan 
as unified entity has emerged as a central item in the agenda of most, if 
not all, parties to the ongoing political conflict since the 1950s. Indeed, 
each of the major parties to the conflict accuses the other of sowing 
the seeds of disintegration and disunity by what it calls for; and on the 
other hand each claims to be the only one genuinely concerned with, 
and capable of, laying down and maintaining the foundations of unity, 
thereby ridding the country of the dangers of disunity and strife. If 
anything, these accusations and counter-accusations manifest the pre-
dicament of all the parties – the elite groups that have been reigning the 
country since independence in 1956.
In these circumstances, it is of ultimate importance to have a clear 
understanding of what these different groups mean by unity and disu-
nity. The need to examine the different concepts of unity and disunity 
advocated by the conflicting parties is all the more important since, in 
the context of Sudan (and Africa in general), concepts of integration and 
unity are premised on recognising the diversity(ies) of the country. In 
their manifestoes and charters, parties to the conflict generally begin by 
asserting and emphasising the diversity of Sudan before they proceed to 
give their account about how to deal with the question of unity. Hence, 
concepts of unity hereby advanced necessarily refer to relations binding 
various elements and parts together within a single whole. We shall con-
sider below how some of these concepts endeavour to construct ‘unity 
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within diversity’ or ‘unity in differentiation’. Certainly, it would be most 
useful to attempt to unravel the theoretical assumptions underlying the 
competing concepts. 
It is not the intention here to identify the actual historical tendencies 
behind the emergence of these concepts. Equally, little attention will be 
paid to the social  forces and movements at work that are capable of con-
summating/realising these concepts of unity. 
In its present from, this paper consists of different sections. Section two 
defines the context of the debate between different approaches to the 
issue of unity/disunity. In the following sections we will confine our 
analysis to two concepts only. In section three, we consider one of the 
two major concepts ‘unity in conformity’ and how it deals with unity in 
differentiation and the difficulties encountered in tackling the issue of 
unity from this perspective. An alternative competing concept, ‘unity in 
diversity’, is considered in section four, with a suggestion that this alter-
native is believed to be more adequate than the ones which have thus far 
been dominant. The last section gives a general conclusion. 
Elements of Sudan’s diversity
An overview of Sudan’s diversity is in order if we are to appreciate the 
debate on rational integration. This begins by recognising the ethnic-
national element of this diversity. According to the much referred to 
census of 1955/ 56, the main ethnic groups are Arabs (39 %), Southerners 
(30%), West Darfur (9%), Beja (6%), West Africans (6%), Nuba (6%), 
Nubia (3%) and Funj (1.7 %) (Republic of Sudan 19621956:Table 6.8).1 
Other accounts of the ethnic composition of Sudan classify these groups 
1 According to the 1955/56 Census, ethnic groups are described as follows: Arabs 
(39%), referring to a mixture of Semitic immigrants and indigenous Hamitic and 
Negroid groups; Southerners (30%) as Nilotic-Hamitic and Sudanic Negroids; West 
Darfurians (9%), referring to indigenous Negroids with some Hamitic and Semitic 
elements; Beja (6%), indigenous Hamitic; West African (6%); Nuba (6%), indigenous 




in terms of 19 main nationalities (Majmoua’a Gawmiyya) and 597 ethnic 
groups (Majmoua’a Airgiyya) (Beshir 1988). Yet, socio-economic changes 
since 1956 together with natural and man-made disasters (desertifica-
tion, famine and civil war) must have resulted one way or another in 
some significant changes in the numerical and demographic weight of 
these ethnic-national groups. On this, the population censuses of 1973 
and 1983 remain silent. Yet no one can claim that these changes have 
obliterated ethnic-national diversities. In peripheral social formations, 
ethnic-national diversities seem to have staying power and post-colonial 
developments actually had the effect of maintaining them.
Ethnic-national diversities have further been sustained by cultural, 
linguistic, religious, social and political differences. It is reported that 
there are 115 dialects with 26 of them as active spoken languages, each 
spoken by more than 100 000 people (Ahmed 1988:7-18). About 52% 
of the population are Arabic-speaking while 48% speak other languages 
(Al-Ayyam 1989). Diversity also expresses itself sharply in religion, with 
Islam, Christianity and ‘other religions’ professed by different sections of 
the population. Both Christianity and other religions claim the support 
of significant sections of the population. Religious heterogeneity is 
further sustained by the prevalence of sectarian cleavages within Islam, 
the religion of the majority.
An important aspect of the complexity of the Sudanese society is the 
diversity marking familial connections, social structures, cultural out-
looks, value systems and gender statuses. These diversities do not only 
affect existing possibilities for social mobility and integration, but have 
equally direct bearing on moral norms, legal status and notions of 
identities (An-Na’im 1987:71-77). Furthermore, there is a diversity of 
traditional political structures; and the highly centralised authoritarian 
structures of the colonial state and the post-colonial state added more to 
the already existing forms of rule.
Equally, Sudan economy is marked by a high degree of heterogeneity. It 
encompasses different modes and forms of production, different sectors, 
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different activities and different interests relating to different social cat-
egories and classes. It is our contention here that an account of the main 
elements of the diversities of Sudanese society is not adequate without 
considering the distribution of the population into various occupational 
categories.
In a situation like the one in Sudan (as in many African countries)2 
where the process of nation formation has yet to mature, these elements 
of diversity work much more towards disintegration than towards inte-
gration.3 In such a context then, it is only natural to ask what begets unity 
in a situation of diversity.4 Indeed, an observer might ask: how come 
that Sudan, given its diversities and prevalent hostilities, is still holding 
together (Spaulding 1987:3-4). What is it that makes the different parts 
of the complex totality of the Sudanese society hold together? Could it be 
the economic structure (mode of production) which imposes unity on 
society? Or is it the efficacy of the political system (the state or political 
community), and the monopoly of power by one group commanding 
unity and suppressing dissent? Or is it the existence of an accommo-
datory and integrative value system at the centre which makes for the 
sustenance of unity?
Framework for analysis
These questions and other related issues have generally shaped the 
debate on national integration in Sudan. Taking part in this debate, some 
2 Like Sudan, many African countries are characterised by ethnic, religious, linguistic, 
social and economic diversities. Among these are Uganda, Ethiopia, Senegal, South 
Africa and Nigeria, to mention but a few countries.
3 The National Population Censuses of 1973 and 1983 have dropped the category of 
ethnic (tribal) designation, probably in the belief that national integration in post-
independence Sudan had rendered this categorisation redundant. However, a number 
of studies have attempted to challenge this contention. For example, see: Umbadda 
1990.
4 The issue of governability and survivability of Sudan as a state was raised on many 
occasions. See Woodward 1988.
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historians writing about Sudan between 1898 and 1956 conceived of the 
country as literally: 
… [a] balkanized world of arrogant and warlike little nations, strut-
ting about belligerently or crouching in surly defensiveness behind 
some tropical magnet line (Spaulding 1987:3-4).
It was the colonial state then, through its centralised and bureaucratic 
structures, which kept peace and ensured unity. Though such concep-
tion might have served an ideological purpose for colonial powers, it 
has some historical and empirical relevance, a relevance which can be 
attested to in the post-colonial period as well.
Other observers argue that what has bestowed unity on the country and 
prevented it from falling apart is not the state but the efficacy of the 
political system at large (Woodward 1988). Yet, some still do believe that 
it is the capacity of the dominant culture of the dominant group which 
is the source of unity and its maintenance in Sudan. What concerns us 
here most is that in this balkanised plural perspective, the emphasis is on 
groups and political centres.
Later a new generation of scholars initiated a shift in the studies con-
cerned with the unity/disunity debate; a shift of their primary focus 
from the ‘real’ or ‘alleged’ centres of various communities (groups) to 
the very boundaries that were presumed to divide them. Consequently, 
the historical balkanised perspective
… [w]as replaced by one of a complex network of interactions 
among people in which all manner of economic, political and cul-
tural influences made themselves felt in an intricate web of reciprocal 
relationships. (Spaulding 1987:4). 
Given this, a rough classification scheme for studies on the debate of 
unity/disunity of the Sudanese society is provided. With warranted 
simplifications, one can think of a continuum with one pole repre-
senting studies focusing on groups, centres and agents, and employing 
various categories of sociological analysis (such as ethnicity, religion and 
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culture). The other pole of the continuum represents studies focusing on 
social processes and structures of under-development, peripheral capi-
talism and state formation, and using political-economic categories of 
analysis. In between the poles of this continuum, a number of studies 
attempted, with varying degrees of success, to synthesise the perspec-
tives of the two poles, employing various categories of analysis, i.e. class, 
ethnicity and state. (Ibrahim 1985; El-Battahani 1988; Shadad 1988; 
Khalid 1990; Umbadda 1990). 
Space does not allow for consideration of these studies here, but two 
major perspectives emerge that form the core of this study and merit 
close attention: unity-in-conformity and unity-in-diversity.
Unity-in-conformity concept
This is a core concept with many variants. After briefly considering the 
theoretical assumption and general features of this concept-variant, this 
section will attempt to relate the concept-variant to the concrete situa-
tion of diversities in Sudanese Society. Concepts of unity and national 
integration are historically shaped by political conjunctures. But as we 
have already mentioned, the social determinants and historical trans-
formations which produced this concept, important as they are, are not 
our prime concern here. An in depth inquiry into the nature of these 
transformations requires a separate treatment.
Historically, the structure of colonial capitalism enabled the centre of 
Sudan to firstly produce a unity-in-conformity concept, the main vari-
ants of which are Arabism and Islamism. Later, the peripheries of Sudan 
responded by advancing a different notion of unity (Africanism), giving 
a different perspective of Sudan identity and national integration. Yet, at a 
conceptual level, Arabism, Islamism and Africanism are all rival variants 
of the core concept of unity-in-conformity, and as such share the same 
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underlying assumptions of the concept.5 A theoretical sketch of this core 
concept is presented by considering some features of these variants; e.g. 
Islamism. It is believed that an elaborate exposition of one variant will, 
to a greater extent, reflect more clearly the underlying assumptions of 
the core concept. Hence what is related to Islamism necessarily applies, 
in essence, to both Arabism and Africanism.
With this in mind, it is our assertion that in dealing with national inte-
gration, the unity-in-conformity concept is idealist, ethnocentric, and 
of totalitarian-authoritative nature leaving aside for the time being its 
patriarchal, retrogressive and other peripheral capitalist features. We 
shall briefly examine how the Islamist variant reflects the traits of the 
core concept.
The ascendancy of the (Arab-Islamic) hegemony has been noted by 
many groups and perceived by them as negatively affecting their role 
and contribution in building a viable unity of Sudan social formation. 
Indeed, some subordinated groups feel that the overall thrust of the 
hegemony of the centre is systematically working towards nullifying 
their distinct cultural attributes. A former prime minister once stated 
that they were not willing to abandon their (Arab-Islamic) culture for 
a mirage (El-Mahdi 1988), referring to indigenous non-Arab-Islamic 
culture and the call for recognising its values and incorporating them 
into to Sudanese identity.6
For its part, the hegemonic centre believes that only by promoting its 
culture could unity of Sudan be maintained. Submitting to the will of 
the centre, or to put it in milder terms, conforming to the value-system 
5 See Beshir & Salih 1984 and Mazrui 1971. According to Hurreiz (1989:79-98), this was 
more in line with the social fabric of Sudanese culture and identity because it enabled 
different groups to mix and merge wishfully, thus forming wider groups. For example, 
cultural process of integration (Arabisation, Islamisation and Africanisation) did 
take place albeit voluntarily, gradually and irregularly. This created the contemporary 
Sudan with its relative unity and inherent disunity.
6 Former Prime Minister El Sadig El-Mahdi, discussing the proposed Penal Code for 
1988 in the Constituent Assembly of 1988-1989.
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of the centre by different groups is taken as a prerequisite for Sudanese 
unity and identity. On the other hand, emphasising the particularity and 
cultural individuality of groups in the peripheries is perceived as a threat 
to the unity of Sudanese society as a whole.
What is, then, the rationale of the centre? What are the philosophical 
bases of the centre’s belief that extending and universalising its ‘superior’ 
culture (religion) over other cultures and groups would ensure unity, 
while resisting this process would foment disunity? As far as the Islamic 
part of the variant concept is concerned, its perspective of unity-disunity 
is essentially derived from Islam. To be more precise, it is derived from a 
particular idealist (revivalist) interpretation and ideological appropria-
tion of Islam. (Hamed 1985)
Like Judaism and Christianity, Islam is a monist religion with a built-in 
universalist drive which conceives the human race as but a target for 
conversion. It is, in effect, pitched in a constant competition with other 
religions and cultures (Mazrui 1990)7 and consequently is less accom-
modating to other creeds and beliefs. This is more likely the case when 
Islamic-revivalist concepts of integration stress the need to universalise 
and absolutise their values as prerequisites for attaining unity and social 
cohesion. In other words, the argument here is that all parts of the whole 
must reflect and share the same essence if the unity of the whole is to be 
secured.
It is believed that the Islamist variant reflects, in an important way, a 
Hegelian idealist conception of totality. This is: 
… an expressive totality, a totality all of whose parts are so many 
total parts each expressing the others, and each expressing the social 
totality that contains them, because each in itself contains in the 
immediate form of its expression the essence of the totality itself… 
(Collinicos 1976:40).
7 Mazrui, A., commenting on his book Cultural Forces in World Politics (Mazrui 1990) in 
the BBC World Service, Meridian Programme on 1990-07-12.
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The unity produced by such a concept is immediately present in, and 
extricable from, each of its parts. Each part of the whole is but the 
expression of the essence of the whole (Collinicos 1976:40). Within this 
perspective, the unity of the whole suppresses the distinctness of the part 
and deprives it of instances (determinations) constituting it. This expres-
sion of the essence of the whole is but the will of the absolute truth, 
reason, or the divine. History is conceived as a process moving towards 
a predetermined end, the rising of the absolute to self-consciousness 
(Collinicos 1976:40) or the realisation of the Almighty’s will on each.
It is not the intention here to discuss the theoretical or philosophical 
aspects of the idealist conception of history, but only to indicate that the 
realisation of self-consciousness by the absolute attainment of unity is 
hampered in reality by many distractions, albeit of temporary nature. 
History is the progressive unfolding of events towards the ultimate 
objective. Here, the role of conscious agents of history (bearers of truth) 
is to affirm the will and majesty of the divine on earth by transcending 
situations of discord and imperfections. 
That these assumptions underlie the Islamists’ variant of unity-in-
conformity concept is not difficult to establish. The foundation of an 
Islamic society-state lies in the doctrine of Tawhid, the unity of Allah 
and human life (El-Turabi 1985:2). In the course of realising this unity, 
the Ummah (nation; in the broad sense) has to strictly adhere to sources 
of religious guidance (The Qur’an and the tradition of the Prophet) and 
the model of Medina experience. In reality, however, many factors and 
historical challenges intervene to thwart the process of Tawhid and frus-
trate the Ummah’s effort to unite and live up to its ideal and destiny. 
(Abdel Gabar 1985:121-134)  
But how does this relate to the question of unity in Sudan? It is main-
tained here that in the context of diversities of Sudanese society, Islamism 
(the attempt to articulate a notion of unity on the bases of this perspec-
tive) is neither conducive to nor a plausible concept for workable unity. 
This, however, should not be taken to mean that Islam, as a repository 
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of values, symbols and aspirations, has no role to play in contributing 
to national unity. Rather, our concern here is confined to Islamism (as 
expressed by leaders of political Islam in Sudan): the concept-variant of 
unity-in-conformity, and it is this which lacks the capacity to positively 
contribute to a viable unity of a diverse society.
In Sudan, Islamism sanctions the Muslim endeavours to absolutise 
their (historically determined) values and culture as bases of unity and 
polity. Indeed, Sudan’s unity and identity are both reduced, according to 
Hassan Mekki (1990:20), a leading Islamist intellectual, to nurturing and 
evolving Islam or, to be more precise, a particular version of Islam:
It is imperative to promote and develop the culture of the centre for 
it is this [Islamic] culture which unites the nation and gives it its dis-
tinct features and attributes. Without this Islamic factor Sudan would 
have never existed… 
To reduce the objective complexity of Sudan cultural and social struc-
tures to Islam is surely to inflate one element of a diverse totality at the 
expense of others, if not to deny the very fact of diversity. The capacity 
and readiness, therefore, to accommodate different elements (for example 
non-Islamic, non-Arab groups) within a unified Sudanese totality is, 
thus, altogether undermined.
Calls to constantly maintain (Islamic) sources of unity are sometimes 
expressed in calls to a Jihad to defend Islam and extend its frontiers 
against the infidels in dar al harab (land of war). Attempts by different 
marginalised groups to press for their otherwise legitimate claims are 
outrightly rejected as impairing unity and publicly dubbed as racist, 
ethnic, ‘tribal,’ ‘atheist,’ ‘secular,’ ‘crusader-like,’ ‘Zionist,’ ‘commu-
nist,’ etc. Quite often, a conspiracy theory is invoked to explain away 
any attempt by internal forces to challenge this monolithic Islamist 
concept-variant of unity. The combined objective these enemy forces 
pursue is claimed to foment disunity by spoiling the creed of the Ummah. 
Consequently, revitalisation of sources of Islamic religion is thus pro-
posed as a panacea to ensure unity and avoid discord. 
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However, in the context of a multiple Sudan, such a panacea is nothing 
but a call for an ethnocentrism or ‘Islamocentrism’. This concept over-
stresses the primary position of Arabic language and culture and regards 
the history of Muslims as the sole repository of values, symbols and 
norms in the light of which modern life of Sudanese people should be 
modelled. Aspects pertaining to Sudanese identity are believed not to be 
negotiable since they are not the product of historical processes, but a 
given fact of Islamic religiosity. Non-Islamic cultures are perceived as a 
threat to Sudanese identity, as they are informed by:
… a militant brand of secular discourse extremism. It is no wonder 
then (since 1955) for such discourse to express itself by raising arms, 
becoming involved in guerrilla activities against the right of Islamic 
culture to exist in the South and to dominate in the North (emphasis 
added) (Mekki 1990:10).
A corollary of this reasoning is the call for the establishment of an Islamic 
state and a totalitarian political system. The logic of this reasoning runs as 
follows: the state (which is a common affair among all believers and citi-
zens of the Sudan) (Mekki 1989) attends to the demands of the majority; 
the majority are Muslims; in Islam the state deals with both private and 
public domains; thus an Islamic state is a guarantee for the unity of the 
country (National Islamic Front 1989:2; Hamid 1988). Notwithstanding 
provisions to safeguard minority rights, this logic expresses an eventually 
totalitarian concept of polity. In this polity: (1) power (legislative, execu-
tive and judiciary) is vested in an Imam, reflecting the will of the Divine 
more than the general will of the people, and (2) the modern concept 
of citizenship is lacking, or at least difficult to reconcile with the Islamic 
concept of polity.8 Fears were expressed as to the tendency to stratify the 
population according to creed as male Muslims, female Muslims, male 
non-Muslims and female non-Muslims (Sudan Times 1988-1989). 
8 Consider the attempts by Sadig El-Mahadi, when he was at Paris, to reconcile between 
his concept of an Islamic State and the Modern (Secular) concept of citizenship.
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Tied to this categorisation of citizens is the uneven distribution of polit-
ical, economic and social goods and entitlements. Many observers believe 
that a version of the Islamist concept-variant of unity had been put into 
practice in Sudan between 1983 and 1985. During this period, social and 
economic differentiations were either religiously sanctioned or else not 
dealt with effectively. Forms of Islamic charity failed to curb social ills. 
Equally, attempts to structurally curb these problems and initiate socio-
economic development led to a controversial situation, to say the least.9 
Consequently, the ensuing deprivations have further consolidated an 
already existing schism and discord which the concept purports to tran-
scend in theory. In a nutshell, Islamocentricism, a totalitarian political 
regime and economic stagnation are hardly conductive to unity.
However, this conclusion is not peculiar to the Islamist variant of the 
unity-in-conformity concept. Other variants (Arabism and Africanism) 
of the concept are equally predisposed to lead to the same dead end. 
Essentially then, this concept of unity-in-conformity with all its variants, 
is inherently antithetical to the very nature of Sudan diversities which 
are grounded on historical objective conditions. Instead of realistically 
dealing with these objective conditions (i.e. recognising and synthe-
sising them), the concept obliterates them only to produce a monolithic 
concept of unity. Traced to its philosophical assumption this can be 
expressed in that, rather than comprehending the complexity and diver-
sity of empirical realities, the sole interest of the concept is to discover 
and establish the Absolute (in Islamism, Arabism, Africanism) in:
Every element, whether of the state or of nature, and the actual 
subjects… come to nothing but their mere names. The world is 
left uncomprehended, reduced to a manifestation of the absolute 
(Collinicos 1976:33).
The limited capacity of this concept to offer a differentiated concept of 
unity can much more clearly be grasped if considered in relation to the 
potential of the rival concept of unity-in-diversity.
9 For an example, see Shaa el-Din & Brown 1985.
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Unity-in-diversity as an alternative concept 
Studies informed by this concept have, to some extent, emerged as a 
critique of the dominant concept of unity-in-conformity. Whilst unity-
in-conformity focuses on the efficacy of cultural variables and political 
groups (the groups-agents pole of the continuum of our theoretical 
sketch), this alternative concept attempts to redress the imbalance by 
leaning more toward the pole of social structures and processes, without 
entirely neglecting socio-cultural variables (ethnicity, religion, etc.).
In order to better account for the complex unity of the Sudanese social 
formation, an urgent need has been felt by many researchers to synthe-
sise the two poles of the theoretical continuum and, then, analytically 
integrate variables relating to both, i.e. class, ethnicity (and the state).10 
Heeding this, a number of studies O’Brien (1986: 898-907), El-Battahani 
(1988), Ibrahim (1985), Shadad (1988) have endeavoured, with varying 
degree of success, to deal  with this theoretical synthesis and integration. 
This paper is an attempt to bring out much more forcefully the theoret-
ical framework underlying these studies, and to contribute to nominating 
unity-in-diversity as viable concept. In contradistinction to the features 
of the unity-in-conformity concept, the concept we are suggesting here 
as a viable alternative is characterised as realist, non-centricist and of his-
torical and dynamic nature. Before we elaborate on these traits, however, 
a note on the methodological premise of this concept is in order.
A methodological premise
In view of the diversities of the Sudanese society (as indicated above), a 
methodological position of the alternative concept is that in peripheral 
 
10 Professor M. O. Beshir (Beshir & Salih 1984) expressed this need when, in one of his 
studies on Diversity and Unity in Sudan, he stated: ‘I have not tried in this paper to 
discuss the issue of ethnicity and class in the case of Sudan. This is not due to any 
rejection and the suggestion that class is relevant or to the proposal that there is no 
correlation between class and ethnicity in other similar cases. The relations are rather 
hard to handle and there is overlapping which can easily lead to confusion.’
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societies patterns of ethnic stratification (cultural stratification) and 
class/occupational stratification and the relations between social groups 
are massively over-determined:
It is this over-determined complexity which constitutes the spe-
cificity of the problem requiring analysis. It does not help, here, to 
depress some factors of this matrix (e.g. ethnicity or class) in favour 
of others (e.g. culture or religion) and then, analytically to subsume 
the former into the latter, since it is precisely the generative specificity 
of each, plus the over-determined complexity of the whole, which is 
the problem… (Hall 1978:152-153).11
This will be clarified further below. Here, suffice it to say that the over-
riding concern of the two competing philosophies or positions is unity 
in a differentiated society. Yet, issues relating to how such unity would be 
achieved are set within a different problematic. In the previous section, 
the account of unity-in-conformity concept has been considered.
As far as the unity-in-diversity concept is concerned, questions as the 
following are raised within this problematic. What fundamentally dis-
tributes the population of Sudan into different occupational/class 
categories? What, essentially, is the role of ethnicity in the distribution 
of these groups and the maintenance of the social order? How have these 
class structures evolved and what role(s) have the state and ethnicity 
played in this? How are we to understand the relations of these variables 
(class, state and ethnicity) in the totality of the whole social matrix and 
its stratification? How, then, is this matrix affected by what we might 
call the ethnic element? Or, for that matter, the religious? And given the 
diversities of Sudanese social formation, as indicated above, what is it 
that maintains the dominant structures of legitimation through this 
apparent complexity? What produces the structures of these societies as 
structure-in-dominance? Above all, what holds this society together?
11 Expressing a similar proposition, Al-Hardalo (1984) cautioned Sudanese Intellectuals 
and Politicians not to magnify one element of Sudan complex structures at the expense 
of another when dealing with the intricate issue of national unity in Sudan.
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Monist and unity-in-conformity analyses suggest that overall cohe-
sion is achieved through the domination of one segment in the political 
institutional order; the universalisation of the centre’s culture and its 
imposition on the constituent parts-regions of the Sudanese society. Yet, 
these analyses, though correct in recognising the centrality of power and 
the hegemonic culture of the centre, conceive questions of unity/disu-
nity in a too limited and segmentary fashion. Imperative integration is 
neither achieved in Sudan exclusively through political institutionalisa-
tion nor via cultural domination. It is our argument that the unity of 
Sudan’s social formation is not a simple, undifferentiated unity as such 
analysts would like us to believe. In differentiated, complex societies, we 
are required to account, not just for the existence of culturally distinct 
institutions and patterns, but also for that which secures the unity, cohe-
sion and stability of this social order in and through (not despite) its 
differences (Hall 1978:152-153). This called for an introduction of a new 
concept of totality, a concept which should be understood in a double 
way: ‘as simultaneously involving tendencies to unity and differentiation’ 
(Post 1990:14). Which pole of the relationship (unity in diversity) will be 
dominant depends on the historically specific conditions and the social 
formation (Wolpe 1989:8). In a word, the unity-in-diversity concept is 
based on a realist concept of totality.
Relevance of the alternative concept
The idealist concept of totality, as interpreted by the unity-in-conformity 
analysis, acknowledges the centrality of the Absolute, the realisation of 
which bestows unity and suppresses the distinctness of the constituent 
unity as a condition for the cohesion of the whole. In contrast to this, 
the unity-in-diversity concept does not attribute the unity of the whole 
to the presence of actualisation of the Absolute nor does it consider the 
whole as something in, yet separable, from its parts. In the realist concept 
of totality:
the unity of the whole does not suppress distinctness of the determi-
nations constituting it; rather this distinctness is the precondition of 
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any unity which is not the self-relation of the spirit (or the Absolute)… 
(Collinicos 1976:45). 
These analyses, derived here from a number of studies, assert the mate-
riality of the world without undermining the significance of spirituality 
and cognition (Post 1990), the specificity of the entities constituting 
the world; and at the same time, (in the case of social formation) their 
unity within a complex structure, ‘structure-in-dominance’ (Collinicos 
1976:45). Unity of the social formation is the function of relations of 
subordination and dominance obtaining between the constituent parts 
of the structure in dominance. To further grasp the nature of this unity, 
it is essential to be more specific about two terms here: complexity and 
structure.
The complexity of the whole depends on comprehending it as consisting 
of a number of distinct but interrelated instances. 
In a nutshell, then, the social totality is a complex structured unity. Its 
complexity lies in the fact that it is a unity of distinct, relatively autono-
mous instances with different modes of development. Its structures lie 
in the fact that its unity results from the hierarchy of the instances as 
determined by the economy in the final analysis. In Collinicos’ (1976:62) 
words, ‘that totality is structured is as essential to its nature as that it is 
complex’.
Contrary to the ethnocentrism of the conformity-based perspective of 
unity which considers differences as antithetical to unity, this perspective 
recognises differences as built-in elements of its totality. A tunnel vision 
perspective is irrelevant here. Instead:
… the differences have to be welcomed as part of the Kaleido-scope 
of national life, contributing in their various ways to the national 
whole. If this can be achieved, we can have unity with diversity – or, 
as we might put: ethnicity (or multi-religiosity) and diversity without 
conflict… (Stevenson 1989:207). 
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Within such a non-ethnocentrist perspective, no culture or value system 
of a particular segment has the moral right to universalise its attributes 
over others as a condition of the unity of the whole. Different parts 
contribute to nurturing unity and national cohesion. Consequently, 
factors which are often regarded as divisive and contributing to a 
breaking down of indigenous culture are now factors which unify 
(Stevenson 1989:205-206) and help bring together different groups, cul-
tures and individuals in a dynamic interaction to create an integrated 
whole. Commenting on the utility of this approach, a Sudanese intel-
lectual (Khalid)12 had it that:
Sudan is an Arab country, but its Arabism is not like that of Syria, 
Sudan is a Muslim country, but Islam in Sudan is not like Islam in 
Saudi Arabia, and Sudan is an African country, but its African char-
acter is not similar to that of Kenya… 
From the point of view of this perspective, differences are recognised 
and contradictions are not written off but dealt with by the people in the 
course of shaping their own destiny. In Callinicos’ words, it is the working 
out of these contradictions between instances constituting the social whole 
which determines its trajectory. History is not the expression of a spiritual 
essence, nor is it the progressive realisation of innate characteristics of a 
nation (Arabism) or culture (Africanism). It is a process whose develop-
ment is the outcome of the relations (and contradictions) of the economic, 
political land ideological instances composing the social whole.
It is peripheral capitalism which defines the trajectory of Sudan’s social 
formation, organising and determining the relations in and between its 
various distances (economic, political and ideological). The resulting 
unity is essentially of an uneven nature, with hierarchically ordered 
instances (and contradictions) within the social totality. It is a unity of 
a janus-faced character; being always simultaneously functional and 
contradictory, both constructive and destructive, both integrative and 
12 During an interview on SPLA/SPLM Radio.
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disintegrative. Which side of the relationship will be dominant depends 
on the historically specific conditions and the social formation.
Obstacles to unity
In Sudan the relations within and between instances are characterised by 
the fact that class and union-class contradictions (ethnic, religious, cul-
tural) overlap and are materially and ideologically mutually reinforcing. 
In the present conjuncture, this has tilted the relations more towards 
a destructive and disintegrative pole. The situations actually obtaining 
can be generally described as hardly conducive, in political, economic 
and social terms, to unity and integration. We shall elaborate on this by 
briefly considering the rigidity of the social structure and social mobility 
processes.
In Sudan, the ethnic factor intertwines with non-ethnic factors (edu-
cation, wealth, occupation, status) to produce a complex, unschematic 
stratification matrix. This does not mean that social differentiation in 
Sudan is exclusively ethnic-based as some studies have tried to establish. 
It is our position here that the stratification system is a class-determined 
one in which ethnic (or religious) elements constitute a relatively more 
visible index of more complex structured peripheral capitalist societies, 
like Sudan, where class, status and ethnicity interpenetrate. The public 
signification of the stratification system
… is more explicit than in societies where no ethnic (religious) index 
exists; it is a more rigid system, since any member of the society (in 
particular those of the oppressed nationalities) rising in status has to 
negotiate more than one system of status symbolism. The calculus of 
social mobility is far more complex… (Hall 1978:152-153).
That is, members of marginalised ethnos, classes and social catego-
ries (e.g. women) passing upward from one position to another have 
to negotiate (peacefully) the public signification of the social structure 
along several axes. 
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This point can be further developed by considering social mobility as 
an index of efficiency and rationality of the existing social structure. An 
over-simplified schema is used here to divide/classify the population into 
three core ethnic categories: Northerners, Easterners and Southerners. 
The dominant classificatory scheme, which reigned in Sudanese studies 
for some time, was based on a Northerners-Southerners dichotomy, but 
this has failed to capture the complexity and diversity of the Sudanese 
society. As an alternative, we suggest here that a category of Westerners 
(not in the geographical sense) be introduced to reflect the diversity 
of social structure. This category of Westerners refers to ethnic group-
ings occupying an intermediary position between Northerners and 
Southerners, sharing ethnic and/or cultural affinities with the former 
and social/economic status with the latter. The criterion thus employed 
is based on a combination of ethnic, social and economic indicators. 
The enhanced or restricted chances for social mobility of the three core 
ethnos, Northerners, Westerners and Southerners, is a function of the 
nature of the stratification system.
The stratification system approximates a pyramid with the upper tri-
angle dominated by Arab-Muslim ruling classes and groups, together 
with a tiny fraction of Westerners and Southerners who were able to 
assimilate or come closer to the jallaba class in economic wealth, social 
status, language, education and values. The jallaba rank highest on all 
social, economic and political aspects, with their positions and privileges 
protected and legitimised as such by state ideology, national chauvinism 
and manipulation of cultural boundaries (i.e. religion). The middle 
layers of the social pyramid are likewise occupied by a predominantly 
Arab-Muslim middle class. This did not result from numerical strength, 
if any, but it is rather a consequence of colonial and post-colonial trans-
formations in education and employment. Yet, there are increasingly 
significant numbers of Westerners and Southerners who managed to pen-
etrate into middle ranking positions and occupations. Peasants, artisans 
and urban workers in the North are congregated in the lower layers of 
the pyramid, but these layers are overwhelmingly dominated by nomads, 
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poor peasants and marginalised groups of Westerners and Southerners, 
for example. The latter are typically incorporated in positions with the 
least status and material reward in the national labour market.
This social stratification system is not legitimated by culture alone, but 
mainly by underlying structures of peripheral capitalism. These struc-
tures historically evolved as an outcome of the intrusion of colonial 
capitalism in the period of 1898-1956, and since then have been main-
tained by post-colonial development. Endeavours to adjust the lop-sided 
nature of the system and remove (ethnic-cultural) irrational barriers 
to social mobility were all in vain. Stagnation, rigidity and inefficiency 
characterised the performance of the social stratification system.
Different analyses have attempted to probe into the nature of the ‘dysfunc-
tionality’ of this system and account for its rigidity and the consequent 
threat it poses to unity and national cohesion. As suggested above, analyses 
derived from the unity-in-diversity concept are much more adequate than 
analyses based on the unity-in-conformity concept in accounting for the 
stagnation and disintegration of present structures. In broad agreement 
with the arguments of this paper, analyses by Shadad (1988), Ali (1990) 
and Umbadda (1990), for example, have stressed the role of the bourgeois 
class nature and the hegemonic faction(s) in mismanaging the economy 
and society and pursuing a dead-end line of development. Hence,
… war, political instability and the resurgence of obscurantist ideology 
(and disunity) are all symptoms of the present crisis in the Sudan. This 
is a crisis of structure and crisis of development (Shadad, 1987:29).    
In other words, the structure-in-dominance is in crisis, meaning that 
the post-colonial national integration projects, largely informed by the 
unity-in-conformity concept and maintained through the hegemonic 
Arab-Muslim domination over all features of organised social life, have 




Studies on integration in Sudan have been placed within a broad 
theoretical sketch of a continuum with two poles: studies on unity-
in-conformity and studies on unity-in-diversity; each having its 
justifications and agents. These form the major dominant concepts of 
unity, albeit a ‘unity’ with different theoretical properties and reasoning. 
In this paper, some theoretical features of the two competing concepts on 
national integration have been considered together with their capacity of 
exploring issues of unity and diversity. Related to this, it is argued that 
the unity-in-diversity concept has much more analytical potential and 
scope than the unity-in-conformity concept. The latter, it is believed, 
does not provide the means for tackling intricate issues of complexities 
and historically evolved contradictions, since the concept is predisposed 
(by its philosophical idealist assumptions) to writing these complexities 
and contradictions off instead of recognising them as real. 
As an alternative, the unity-in-diversity concept is not only capable of 
accounting for the structured contradictions and complexities of the 
Sudanese society, but is more conducive to constructing a viable project 
of unity in differentiation. This is so because the stagnation and dis-
integration characterising existing structures of Sudan are conceived as 
a product of socio-economic processes. Removing the rigidities of the 
system and its disintegrative factors does not mean wishing away objec-
tive contradictions and differences, but instead comprehending and 
dealing with them within a new paradigm that sets them as parts of the 
transformation and rebuilding process. 
Though there are no guarantees in history and though the crisis-ridden 
situation in Sudan is open to many options, nonetheless, there are 
moments in Sudan’s political history which point to a possibility of a 
way out. Armed with this unity-in-diversity perspective, forces of change 
would be able to thrash out an appropriate, sound political project which 
would, among other things, contribute to nurturing and consolidating 
peace, harmony and coexistence among the diverse groupings of society; 
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and create a stock of symbols, ideas and ideals sufficient to accommo-
date and contain contradictory impulses, and push forth a consistent, 
historical, progressive unfolding of Sudanese nation formation.
Since this is not an idealist conception, it is more plausible, for example, 
to conceive of differentiation in economic status and life-chances as a 
function of a rationally-based open system with no built-in ethnic and 
cultural barriers to social mobility. Therefore, a just and a fair system is all 
that is required for the working out of contradictions and complexities. 
And what is more, the potential for this, and consequently for a viable 
unity, is there. It is the task for further research to dig in the ethnography, 
social history and culture to lay bare the untapped symbols and resources 
that support and encourage coexistence, tolerance and accommodation. 
As people elsewhere, Sudanese people make their own history within 
conditions not entirely of their choice. Whether the Sudanese remain 
as one united, nation or whether they become disintegrated into many 
‘nations’ would be the outcome of their own doing. Unlike proponents 
of the unity-in-conformity concept, adherents to unity-in-diversity are 
more in line with ‘historic calling’ and their choices seem to align more 
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